One might think of this book as a key effort to mainstream constructivist analysis in IR and show how security or securitization is used as an alternative and extreme form of politics. Buzan, Waever In he was elected a fellow of the British Academy. He has written, co-authored or edited over twenty books, written or co-authored more than one hundred and thirty articles and chapters, and lectured, broadcast or presented papers in over twenty countries.
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Buzan, Barry. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN X hc:alk. ISBN pbralk. Security, International. National security. International economic relations.
Wilde, Jaap de. B89 A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. It examines the distinctive character and dynam ic'of security inifliy sectors: military, political, economic, environmental, and societal.
Our question was, How could security complex. But could this Name logic be extended into the newer sectors as the relative importance of. As a consequence, the project became more ambitious, evolving into a general consideration of how to understand and analyze international security without losing sight of the original purpose. But different parts do have distinctive individual stamps.
Barry Buzan was the main drafter of Chapters 1, 3, 5, and 9; was largely responsible for the sectoral approach; and took overall responsibility for editing and coordinating the work. Jaap de Wilde, the newest member of the Copenhagen research group, was the main drafter of Chapter 4 and the first two sections of Chapter 8, made substantial inputs into Chapters 5 and 9, and restrained the other two from taking a too unquestioning position toward realist assumptions.
We have received a great amount of help with this project. First and foremost, our thanks to the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, whose generous grant made it possible for Buzan to devote his main attention to this book during the years —, for us to assemble a team of experts who provided continual critical scrutiny, and for the support of the cost of a research assistant. All of the consultants made extensive written comments at various stages of the drafting of the book. This final version owes much to their input, although they bear no formal responsibility for what is written here.
And thanks to Eva Maria Christiansen and Mads Voge, our research assistants, who handled most of the logistical tasks and sometimes worked unreasonable hours without complaint.
The purpose of this book is to set out a comprehensive new framework for security studies. Our approach is based on the work of those who for well over a decade have sought to question the primacy of the military element and the state in the conceptualization of security. This questioning has come from diverse sources rarely coordinated with each other. As a consequence, two views of security studies are now on the table, the new one of the wideners and the old military and state-centered view of the traditionalists.
Doing so requires both unifying concepts and a method for pursuing the wider agenda in a coherent fashion. There are intellectual and political dangers in simply tacking Ihe word security onto an ever wider range of issues. Lebow The function, and therefore the status and funding, of the entire edifice of strategic studies built up during the Cold War seemed to be at risk; consequently, the military focus of strategic analysis seemed extremely vulnerable to pressure from the wideners.
In varying degrees, they accepted the need to look more widely at nonmilitary causes of conflict in the international system and made little explicit attempt to defend the centrality of the state in security analysis at a time when so many nonstate actors were playing vigorously in the military game. Most traditionalists insist on military conflict as the defining key to security and are prepared to loosen their state Centrism. Some traditionalists Chipman ; Gray have argued that there was simply a return to the natural terrain of the subject after the artificial nuclear narrowing of the Cold War, but the key strategy was to allow widening only inasmuch as it could be linked to concerns about the threat or actual use of force between political actors.
As Chipman put it:. This dissatisfaction Was stimulated first by the rise of the economic and environmental agendas in international relations during the s and s and later by the rise of concerns with identity issues and transnational crime during the s.
A key argument was that progressive widening endangered the intellectual coherence of security, putting so much into it that its essential meaning became void. This argument perhaps masked a generally unspoken political concern that allowing nonmilitary issues to achieve security status would have undesirable and counterproductive effects on the entire fabric of social and international relations more on this in Chapter 9. Buzan has argued for retaining a distinctively military subfield of strategic studies within a wider security studies ; , chapter The defense of the traditionalist position got underway as the Cold War unraveled.
The structuring element of strategic analysis must be the possible use of force.. Stephen Walt gives perhaps the strongest statement on the traditionalist position. This solution offers the possibility of breaking free from the existing dispute between the two approaches. The need is to construct a conceptualization of security that means something much more specific than just any threat or problem. Threats and vulnerabilities can arise in many different areas, military and nonmilitary, but to count as security issues they have to meet strictly defined criteria that distinguish them from the normal run of the merely political.
They have to be staged as existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind. More worryingly, it also does two other things. First, given the political function of the word security, the wider agenda extends the call for state mobilization to a broad range of issues.
As Deudney has pointed out, this may be undesirable and counterproductive in the environmental sector, and the argument could easily be extended into other sectors.
Even this degree of relative desirability can be questioned: liberals, for example, argue that too much economic security is destructive to the workings of a market economy.
Security should not be thought of too easily as always a good thing. The main purpose of this book is to present a framework based on the wider agenda that will incorporate the traditionalist position.
Our solution comes down on the side of the wideners in terms of keeping the security agenda open to many different types of threats. We seek to find coherence not by confining security to the military sector hut by exploring the logic of security itself to find out what.
Levels of Analysis For more than three decades, the debate about levels of analysis has been central to much of international relations theory Buzan c; Onuf Levels also run through all types of security analysis, whether in debates about preferred referent objects for security individuals versus states or about the causes of war system structure versus the nature of states versus human nature.
By levels, we mean objects for analysis that are defined by a range of spatial scales, from small to large. Theories may suggest causal explanations from one level to another—for example, top down from system structure to unit behavior e.
But nothing is intrinsic to levels themselves that suggests any particular pattern or priority of relations among them. In the study of international relations, the five most frequently used levels of analysis are as follow: 1. Currently, this level encompasses the entire planet, but in. Subunits, meaning organized groups of individuals within units that are able or that try to affect the behavior of the unit e. Individuals, the bottom line of most analysis in the social sciences.
Levels provide a framework within which one can theorize; they are not theories in themselves. Neorealism, for example,- locates its source of explanation structure at the system level and its main outcome self-help at the unit level. ASEAN are clearly subsystemic. The same can be said for multinational firms.
On this basis, the levels-of-analysis scheme has been criticized for reinforcing the state centrism and inside-outside. There is no necessity for levels to privilege states—the unit level can encompass much more than states.
But we do accept the reminder that in international relations one should be aware of the tendency for the levels-of-analysis scheme to reinforce state-centric thinking. Sectors What does it mean to adopt a more diversified agenda in which economic, societal, and environmental security issues play alongside military and political ones? Thinking about security in terms of sectors pimply grew up with little reflection during the later decades of the Cold War as new issues were added to the military-political agenda.
The practice of resorting to sectors is common but is seldom made explipit. Realists from Morgenthau to Waltz talk in terms of political theory, thereby assuming that sectors mean something analytically significant.
One way of looking at sectors is to see them as identifying specific types of interaction. Buzan set out sectors in security analysis as follows. Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power.
Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend. If a multisectoral approach to security was to be fully meaningful, referent objects other than the state had to be allowed into the picture.
The present book extends this line of argument much further. Sectors serve to disaggregate a whole for purposes of analysis by selecting some of its distinctive patterns of interaction.
But items identified by sectors lack the quality of independent existence. The purpose of selecting them is simply to reduce complexity to facilitate analysis. The use of sectors confines the scope of inquiry to more manageable proportions by reducing the number of variables in play. The military strategist looks at the systems in terms that highlight offensive and defensive capability and justify restrictive assumptions, such as the motivation of behavior by opportunistic calculations of coercive advantage.
Each is looking at the whole but is seeing only one dimension of its reality. The analytical method of sectors thus starts with disaggregation but must end with reassembly. The disaggregation is performed only to achieve simplification and clarity. Our interest in regions as a focus for security analysis stems not only from our previous work on regional security complex theory but also from an interest in the widespread assumption that in the post-Cold War world, international relations will take on a more regionalized character.
Reinforcing this tendency is the fact that the weakening of the commitment to global engagement among the great powers is matched by ever rising power capabilities in most parts of the world. The long period of European and Western power advantage is being steadily eroded by the diffusion of industrial, military, and political capability among an ever wider circle of states and peoples.
In terms of level of analysis, regions are a special type of subsystem. Regions are objects of analysis in themselves, particular locations where one can find outcomes and sources of explanation.
Why does this type of territorial subsystem or any particular instance of it come into being and sustain itself as a feature of the wider international system? Perhaps the best general explanation of regional state systems can be derived from the thinking of Hans Mouritzen , He starts with the simple but seldom considered fact that the units states are fixed rather than mobile.
In contemporary international relations theory, it is taken for granted that the main political units are not mobile, but this was not always so. For thousands of years prior to the fifteenth century, barbarian tribes were a major feature of the international system. These tribes could and did move over long distances.
In those times, it was not uncommon to find one morning that one had a great power as a neighbor where there had been no neighbor before.
Security: A New Framework for Analysis
Buzan, Barry. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN X hc:alk. ISBN pbralk. Security, International. National security.
Hart, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management. It will become an important and possibly definitive reference work in the field of security studies A remarkable piece of work which will surely remain required reading for many years to come. Traditionalists in the field of security studies tend to restrict the subject to politico—military issues; while wideners want to extend it to the economic, societal, and environmental sectors. This book sets out a comprehensive statement of the new security studies, establishing the case for the broader agenda. The authors argue that security is a particular type of politics applicable to a wide range of issues. Answering the traditionalist charge that this model makes the subject incoherent, they offer a constructivist operational method for distinguishing the process of securitization from that of politicization.