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The scarcity of large firms and their heterogeneity hampers the ability to find proper counterfactuals for very large companies and makes it difficult to use proper inference methods to measure the impact of a specific policy. In order to address these methodological issues, we propose using the synthetic control method, initially developed by Abadie et al.
We apply this method to evaluate the impact of a new French science-industry transfer initiative and compare the results with the random trend model and more standard counterfactual approaches. Based on data covering a long pre-treatment period — and ongoing treatment period — , we reveal a convergence between the results obtained with the synthetic control method and the random trend model, and demonstrate that traditional counterfactual evaluation methods are not appropriate for large firms.
Moreover, the synthetic control method has the advantage of providing an individual assessment of the policy impact on each firm. Beyond this specific transfer policy, this study suggests that the synthetic control method opens new research perspectives in policy impact evaluation at the firm level.
Emilie Dargaud, Armel Jacques, Working paper GATE When multi-product firms make simultaneous price-fixing agreements in different markets, the introduction of leniency programs may induce firms to compartmentalize their activities. We study how variation of fine reduction may produce procompetitive but also procollusive effects.
These models do not explore, however, why investors would discount tail risk so heavily. This response is especially pronounced for those who exhibit a strong emotional response to tail losses. They also achieved higher earnings when tail events occurred frequently. In this study, we aimed to evaluate the impact of testing on the fatality rate. We use data on inpatients across French geographic areas and propose a novel methodology that exploits policy discontinuities at region borders to estimate the effect of testing symptomatic individuals on the case-fatality rate in France.
We compare all contiguous department pairs located on the opposite sides of a region border. Department pairs have different testing rates but share similar health trends. The heterogeneity in testing rate between department pairs together with the similarities in other dimensions allow us to mimic the existence of treatment and control groups and to identify the impact of testing on the mortality rate.
We find that in France, the increase of one percentage point in the test rate is associated with a decrease of 0. Putting this number into perspective involves that for each additional tests, one person would have remained alive. In this paper, we show that the probability of being recalled is much higher among unemployment benefit recipients than nonrecipients. We argue that a large part of the observed difference in recall shares is accounted for by the design of the unemployment insurance financing scheme characterized by an experience rating system.
We develop a search and matching model with different unemployment insurance status, endogenous separations, recalls and new hires. We quantify what would have been the labor market under alternative financing scheme.
In the absence of the experience rating, the hiring and separations would have been higher in the long run and more volatile. Experience rating system contributes significantly to the difference in recalls between the recipients and the nonrecipients. These papers share common assumptions, heterogeneity among traders and credit market imperfection, but differ in the role of the bubble, used to provide liquidities or as collateral in a borrowing constraint.
In this paper, we introduce heterogeneous traders by considering an overlapping generations model with households living three periods.
Young households cannot invest in capital, while adults have access to investment and face a borrowing constraint. Introducing bubbles in a quite general way, encompassing the different roles they have in the existing literature, we show that the bubble may enhance growth when the borrowing constraint is binding.
More significantly, our results do not depend on the - liquidity or collateral role attributed to the bubble. We finally extend our analysis to a stochastic bubble, which may burst with a positive probability.
Because credit and bubble are no more perfectly substitutable assets, the liquidity and collateral roles of the bubble are not equivalent. Growth is larger when bubbles play the liquidity role, because the burst of a bubble used for liquidity is less damaging to agents who invest in capital.
This resulted in a more deserving pool of applicants. At the same time, those who stopped applying had worse health, worked less, and were more likely to be on UI and social assistance than workers who did not apply in the old system. There are no additional targeting gains at the point of the award decision, implying that changes in average health conditions of awardees were fully driven by self-screening and work resumption in the DI waiting period. Luigi Butera, Philip J.
Grossman, Daniel Houser, John A. Using data from a series of laboratory experiments, we study the causal effect of trader communication on the price efficiency of markets. We show that communication allows markets to convey private information more effectively. This effect is most pronounced when the communication platform publicizes a reputation score that might identify a person as not being truthful.
This illustrates the need for market designers to consider social interactions when designing market institutions to leverage the social motives that foster information aggregation. Relative feedback stimulates effort by informing on the marginal return or the marginal cost of effort, and by activating behavioral forces even in the absence of monetary incentives.
These behavioral mechanisms relate to self-esteem, status concerns, competitive preferences and social learning. Relative feedback sometimes discourages or distorts effort, notably if people collude or are disappointment averse. In addition to incentive schemes and social preferences, the management of self-confidence affects the way relative feedback impacts productivity.
The mechanisms behind peer effects include conformism, social pressure, rivalry, social learning and distributional preferences, depending on the presence of payoff externalities or technological and organizational externalities. Zakaria Babutsidze, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Adam Zylbersztejn, Working paper GATE We experimentally study the effect of the mode of digital communication on the emergence of swift trust in a principal-agent relationship. Communication is pre-play, one-way, and unrestricted, but its verbal content is homogenized across treatments.
We also report that trust in female principals is sensitive to the availability of nonverbal cues about interaction partners. In contrast with this view, neuroscience research with animals has shown that stochastic rewards may act as a powerful motivator.
Applying these ideas to the study of work addiction in humans, and using a new experimental paradigm, we demonstrate how stochastic rewards may lead people to continue working on a repetitive and effortful task even after monetary compensation becomes saliently negligible.
In line with our hypotheses, we show that persistence on the work task is especially pronounced when the entropy of stochastic rewards is high, which is also when the work task generates more stress to participants.
We discuss the economic and managerial implications of our findings. Using an experimental design, we manipulate social pressure at work by varying the type of workplace monitoring and the extent to which employees engage in social interaction.
This design allows us to assess the effectiveness as well as the popularity of each solution. Despite similar effectiveness in boosting productivity across solutions, only organizational systems involving social interaction via chat were at least as popular as a baseline treatment. This suggests that any solution based on promoting social interaction is more likely to be embraced by workers than monitoring systems alone.
Focusing on the French cluster policy during the period , this study aims at evaluating how cluster policies influence the structure of local innovation networks following network topologies that may be beneficial for regional innovation. Based on a panel data of four periods and 94 NUTS3 French regions, we estimate spatial Durbin models, allowing us to identify direct, indirect and total effects of cluster policies.
Beyond the heterogeneous effects, the results also highlight that cluster policies may lead to a regional competition for the strengthening of innovation networks. Do they encourage local ties? Do they induce network additionality?
Focusing on French data, our results suggest that cluster policies may lack effectiveness in tackling network failures. Muhammed Bulutay, Camille Cornand, Adam Zylbersztejn, Working paper GATE Experimental evidence shows that the rational expectations hypothesis fails to characterize the path to equilibrium after an exogenous shock when actions are strategic complements. Under identical shocks, however, repetition allows adaptive learning, so that inertia in adjustment should fade away with experience.
If this finding proves to be robust, inertia in adjustment may be irrelevant among experienced agents. The conjecture in the literature is that inertia would still persist, perhaps indefinitely, in the presence of real-world complications such as nonidentical shocks.
Herein, we empirically test the conjecture that the inertia in adjustment is more persistent if the shocks are nonidentical. For both identical and nonidentical shocks, we find persistent inertia and similar patterns of adjustment that can be explained by backward-looking expectation rules.
An increase in government purchases raises aggregate demand, tightens the labor market and reduces unemployment. This in turn lowers unemployment risk and thus precautionary saving, leading to a larger response of private consumption than in a model with perfect insurance. The output multiplier is further amplified through a composition effect, as the fraction of high-consumption households in total population increases in response to the spending shock.
These features, along with the matching frictions in the labor market, generate significantly larger multipliers in recessions than in expansions.
As the pool of job seekers is larger during downturns than during expansions, the concavity of the job-finding probability with respect to market tightness implies that an increase in government spending reduces unemployment risk more in the former case than in the latter, giving rise to countercyclical multipliers. Julien Albertini, Xavier Fairise, Anthony Terriau, Working paper GATE How do labor market and health outcomes interact over the life cycle in a country characterized by a large informal sector and strong inequalities?
To quantify the effects of bad health on labor market trajectories, wealth, and consumption, we develop a life-cycle heterogeneous agents model with a formal and an informal sector. We estimate our model using data from the National Income Dynamics Study, the first nationally representative panel study in South Africa. We run counterfactual experiments and show that health shocks have an important impact on wealth and consumption. The channel through which these shocks propagate strongly depends on the job status of individuals at the time of the shock.
For formal workers, bad health reduces labor efficiency, which translates into lower earnings. For informal workers and the non-employed, the shock lowers the job finding rate and in- creases job separation into non-employment, which results in a surge in non-employment spells. As bad health spells persist more for non-employed than for employed individuals, the interaction between labor market risks and health risks generates a vicious circle. The dichotomous structure of the informational basis of Approval voting as well as its aggregative rationale are jointly derived from a set of normative conditions on the voting procedure.
Such result is promising insofar it suggests that the informational basis of voting may have a normative relevance that deserves formal treatment. We investigate whether there exist stable international long-term agreements that take into account the disparities between countries in terms of geological endowments and productive capacity, while caring about future generations. For that purpose, we build an original cooperative game framework, where countries can form coalitions in order to optimize their discounted consumption stream in the long-run, within the limits of their stock of natural resources.
We use the concept of the recursive core that satisfies both coalitional stability and time consistency. We show that this set is nonempty, stating that an international long-term agreement along the optimal path will be self-enforcing. The presented model can be viewed as a tool to refresh the common look at the North-South opposition and sets the conceptual framework for the exploration of a fair sharing of the fruits of global economic growth.
Adam Zylbersztejn, Zakaria Babutsidze, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Working paper GATE We experimentally investigate how much value people put in observable information about others in strategic interactions. In Experiment 1, we vary the source of information about the target player neutral picture, neutral video, video containing strategic content.
The observed prediction accuracy rates then serve as an empirical measure of the objective value of information. In Experiment 2, we elicit the subjective value of information using the standard stated preferences method "willingness to accept".
While the elicited subjective values are ranked in the same manner as the objective ones, subjects attach value to information which does not help predict target behavior, and exaggerate the value of helpful information. Bertrand Garbinti, Jonathan Goupille-Lebret, Thomas Piketty, Working paper GATE Measuring and understanding the evolution of wealth inequality is a key challenge for researchers, policy makers, and the general public.
This paper breaks new ground on this topic by presenting a new method to estimate and study wealth inequality. This method combines fiscal data with household surveys and national accounts in order to provide annual wealth distribution series, with detailed breakdowns by percentiles, age and assets. Using the case of France as an illustration, we show that the resulting series can be used to better analyze the evolution and the determinants of wealth inequality dynamics over the period.
Rising inequality in saving rates coupled with highly stratified rates of returns has led to rising wealth concentration in spite of the opposing effect of house price increases.
Le Coran – AbdAllah Penot