Hamoodur Rahman Commission report surfaces again. E very now and then something about this report crops up in the press and a lot of brouhaha is made by those who want it to be published pronto and those who want to keep it a dead secret. Parts of the report have been published several times in foreign press. But the full report has not been published verbatim and there is no certainty that some doctoring has not been done by either those who leaked it or by others who might have been instrumental in some way in the act of its publishing. The liberal opinion within the country is unanimous that the report should at least now see the light of the day after 30 years of the events it investigated. There are elements in the armed forces and some parts of the government that think that its publication would harm the national interests.
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Hamoodur Rahman Commission report surfaces again. E very now and then something about this report crops up in the press and a lot of brouhaha is made by those who want it to be published pronto and those who want to keep it a dead secret.
Parts of the report have been published several times in foreign press. But the full report has not been published verbatim and there is no certainty that some doctoring has not been done by either those who leaked it or by others who might have been instrumental in some way in the act of its publishing.
The liberal opinion within the country is unanimous that the report should at least now see the light of the day after 30 years of the events it investigated. There are elements in the armed forces and some parts of the government that think that its publication would harm the national interests. Which national interests would they be, after 30 years of the war?
Presumably the worry is about the opinion within the country. Insofar as the principles of good governance are concerned, there is absolutely no case to keep the report unpublished. There have been reports that most copies of the report were destroyed in , if not earlier.
But that seems to be rather unlikely. The government and the armed forces would certainly have in their secret archives several copies of the full report. Doubtless, Pakistan has had an unenviable record of governance and in any case it is a truly underdeveloped country. Even so it would be passing strange if the state is being run in a fashion in which such an important document dealing with truly sensitive matters at that time could have been really destroyed.
That would presuppose that Pakistanis were living in the days before the nation state was invented. No, it seems unlikely that this could have happened even in Pakistan. However, the question of image of the armed forces needs to be looked into. The hard fact is that there was an East Pakistan Crisis. There were disturbances from about end of February to early March in as a result of which Sahibzada Yaqub Khan resigned his command having developed differences with the GHQ over the hawkish approach favoured by the latter.
Later Governor Admiral S. Ahsan also resigned as the Governor for exactly the same reason. It is a fact that GHQ was dominated by hawks vis-a-vis East Pakistan and their response to the speeches of Shaikh Mujibur Rahman on March 7 and 15, as also the orientation of his leadership was displayed in the military crackdown late on March 25 with indiscriminate shooting from guns, large and small.
At length a lot of young Bengalis went underground and organised Mukti Bahini with the support of India. India encouraged them and armed them. Later the Indians took the matters in their own hands and invaded East Pakistan.
The Pakistan armed forces could fight barely for two weeks and surrendered. The ignominy of this resistance was shown by the fact that while the garrison that surrendered in Dhaka comprised 25 thousand troops. The Indian column that occupied Dhaka had only 5 thousand troops on December The effects of the surrender is now history as also the conduct of the armed forces during those critical nine months. The Indians and the western press had gone to town on Pakistan; in world media the name of Pakistan was mud.
The news management by the military in East Pakistan ensured that the worst was believed abroad; all supporters of Bengalis were given a bonanza by preventing accurate reporting from East Pakistan. The fact is that only West Pakistani people were denied any access to accurate information of what was going on in East Pakistan remains to be assessed.
Maybe that if the nature of the conduct by troops and officers in East Pakistan had been more or less correctly reflected in the press and media of West Pakistan, it is possible that the image of the forces might have been tarnished. But this would only be a minority opinion.
The crackdown on Dhaka was hailed by Mr. Everybody knew that West Pakistani opinion was being reflected by Mr. Bhutto and his party that had not put up one single candidate in East Pakistan in the first ever December polls. No doubt that there were dissenting opinions in West Pakistan. Not so, the leader of the PPP that commanded 88 seats in a house of but who aspirated the opinions mainly of the Punjabi voters which, importantly, reflected also the view of the ruling establishment.
No one can doubt the full support of PPP for the military action of Gen. Yahya Khan on that March 25 and in subsequent months. That Bhutto developed his own complaints against Yahya Khan is a separate and a later story. Yahya Khan for all his dictatorial status, his actions were commonly accepted and supported in West Pakistan. The regime did not encounter much resistance right down to the period leading up to the war. It was only after the disastrous results of the war were known that some people protested.
For the rest, West Pakistan, by and large, supported Yahya Khan and his military action. The question of the image of armed forces within West Pakistan is a question on which no easy or firm statement can be made. A great deal of West Pakistani opinion would probably still have approved of whatever the armed forces were doing even if all the fact had been fully reported. Somehow the opinion makers in West Pakistan, chiefly represented by Urdu newspapers, were clearly hostile to all the Bengali aspirations.
They pooh poohed the Bengali grievances. What however remains true is that the influence of the people who were actually opposed to the whole East Pakistan policy of Gen. Yahya Khan and his Junta was negligible. It is questionable whether there would have been a great uproar or great revulsion against the armed forces if the reports of what they were doing were published in full.
If the foregoing assessments of the situation is correct, a clear light is thrown on the question. Various inquiries have been conducted in this country and the reports have stayed secret. No authoritative enquiry report has been published, not even by foreign experts. Indeed, there was a curious Pak Air crash in which some of the original investigators, and supposedly with all the files, perished.
There were various other inquiries about mutinies, Ojhri camp fire, that have never seen the light of the day. Not even the Narayanganj riots report has been published. There has been a pervasive culture of secrecy in this country. The governments somehow wish to hide the truth.
Preference for secrecy is only one side of the coin, the other side is the distrust of the people. It is a moot point whether an image of the armed forces that requires so much secrecy and running away from facts can really be helpful to the armed forces. On the contrary, it would appear that the armed forces are being badly advised to go on insisting on total secrecy over facts that are known throughout the world.
There is the general dictum that all civilisations have believed in: truth and the whole truth cannot really hurt. If an image can be hurt by truth, then it is surely not worth preserving. In any case, it is not likely to survive. The Armed Forces and the rest of those who politically support them will be judged by the people as well as history on the basis of their conduct.
Hiding uncomfortable reports do not change the course of history. On a longer view of things, the armed forces are being hurt more by secrecy than if all the facts had been known. What really is the image of the armed forces in the country today? This has to be sharply distinguished from the image of any particular set of senior officers in the eyes of their own troops is a wholly different kettle of fish.
One is not concerned with the latter, though many army leaders might be. In the overall context of the country, this can easily be ignored; it is relevant only inside the army, not even in the other services. This is a fact of life and should be faced by all. Moreover the image of the armed forces can only be based on what the people see and note about them in peace and their conduct in war.
There have been four clear military takeovers. Nearly half the life of Pakistan has been spent under military rules. There were three occasions when armed forces were used to quell what were thought to be disturbances: in in Punjab, in and in Balochistan. Here the Operation Closed Door in East Pakistan of s can be ignored, though it was a fairly big operation. Then there have been reports of conspiracies within the army beginning in , twice in early s and once in s.
It is the overall picture in the mind of the common Pakistanis that goes into making of all an overall image. Here again, as in the case of events, the majority opinion still is strongly pro-armed forces.
But it is only the majority. The nation should not run away from facts under imaginary fears of a minority. There has been a lot of nonsense uttered in this country about the imagmanship. Far too many people with media background have made their careers on the plea that they understand the intricacies of image making.
One has no desire to hurt the chances of slick people trying to improve their own fortunes by advising on the question of improving the image of this, that and other thing, including governments. The armed forces have of course their own department to look after their image. They should not need outside advisors who themselves would be well advised to leave the armed forces alone.
They can manage their own image better. Finally, a simple statement can be made: Is it or is it not a fact that the image must have some relationship with facts. Can anyone keep an image burnished, if facts do not support it?
Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report Urdu.pdf
The Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report or War Report  contains the Government of Pakistan 's official and classified papers of the events leading up to loss of East Pakistan and the war with India. That single report was handed over to the government , which forbade its publication at the time. An editorial entitled, " Gen Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan - 4 " written by Ardeshir Cowasjee on the basis of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report, demonstrated that "three men principally had been responsible for the loss, at the end of , of half of Jinnah's Pakistan— end of story. Originally, it was thought that the Government of Pakistan had declassified the Report in and was made it available to the public as public domain whereas it was free to download on the internet. However, it was reported to be a "Supplementary Report" which was created after the prisoners of war returned after two years. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. This article is about the final report issued by the Hamoodur Rahman Commission.
Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report